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The No Solicitation-No Distribution Rule
and Presumptions of Validity: Conflict in
the Health Care Field

Employees in health care facilities' seeking to exercise their self-organizational rights have met strong opposition from employers who contend
that the quality of patient care will be disrupted by union organization
activity. Most hospitals have restricted or forbidden such union activity
through a no solicitation-no distribution rule, forbidding employees from
soliciting other employees for union membership and from distributing
union literature,8 either within the hospital as a whole or in certain areas
only. The validity of the no solicitation-no distribution rule in the hospital has been repeatedly challenged since the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) was further amended in 1974 to include employees of nonprofit health care institutions. 4 Prior to the 1974 amendments,' private,
1. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974)(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 183 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1974 amendments]
define a health care institution as "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance
organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted
to the care of the sick, infirm, or aged person." National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) §
2(14), 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has interpreted this definition to include a variety of institutions related to health care, including
state medical associations, California Medical Ass'n, 223 N.L.R.B. 201, 91 L.R.R.M. 1534
(1976); dental practices, Jack L. Williams, D.D.S., 219 N.L.R.B. 1045, 90 L.R.R.M. 1188
(1975); and medical partnerships of as few as five doctors, Private Medical Group, 218
N.L.R.B. 1315, 89 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1975). See Shepard, Health Care Institution Labor Law:
Case Law Developments, 1974-78, 4 Am. J.L. & MED. 1, 4 (1978).
2. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ...
3. This literature may include union leaflets or newsletters and registration cards, which
allow employees to show interest in petitioning the NLRB for a secret ballot election as
provided in NLRA § 9(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1976).
4. Private, nonprofit hospitals were included by deleting from the definition of "employer" in § 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), the provision that an employer shall
not include "any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earn" Fair Labor Stanings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ..
dards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1(a), (b), 88 Stat. 395.
5. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified
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nonprofit hospitals had enjoyed an exemptionO from coverage under the
NLRA.
The fundamental issue in each case, as recently noted by Chief Justice
Burger, "is whether the employees' organizational rights affected by the
hospital rules in question are superior to the hospital's needs in carrying
out its mission."1 7 The key to understanding the wavering line of decisions
since 1974 in this area of labor law is the set of presumptions used by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) when it attempts to determine
the validity of a hospital's no solitication-no distribution rule. The content and application of these presumptions ultimately determine the outcome of the cases by setting a standard of proof which hospital employers
must meet to enforce their restrictions. Unfortunately, these presumptions remain a controversial issue in the health care field of labor law,
because no definite limits to the application of the presumptions have
been established by the Supreme Court. An analysis of the development
of the presumptions and a review of the recent cases applying them reveal
at least some guidance for labor law practitioners in the health care
industry.

I. DE VELOPmENT OF PRESUMPTIONS AND 1974 AMENDMENTS
Section 7' of the NLRA sets forth the basic right of employees to organize. Concomitant with that right to organize is the right to solicit
union membership and to distribute union literature. As the Supreme
Court noted in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,'
[O]rganizational rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the history
of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of
freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights. 10
Moreover, the Court has recognized that "[t]he place of work is a place
uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to employees." Section
8 (a)(1) of the NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 183 (1976)).
6. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
amending NLRA, ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
7. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 793 (1979).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
9. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
10. Id. at 543.
11. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974).
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of the rights guaranteed in section 7."" Thus, the NLRB strives hard to
protect these rights of employees from unlawful infringement.
However, weighed against the organizational rights of employees are
the private property rights of employers, including the right to conduct
their business in an orderly, disciplined manner. A balance must be
struck between these essential rights of employees and employers in order
to maintain them."3 Consequently, in determining the validity of an employer's no solicitation-no distribution rule the NLRB has developed two
presumptions. The presumptions were first announced in Peyton Packing
Co.," along with the NLRB's reasoning:
The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company
time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an
employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation
during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the
absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It
is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after
work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as
he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on
company property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer
to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property. Such a
rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline. 1'

The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's presumptions in Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,'1 noting: "We perceive no error in the Board's
adoption of this presumption. .

.

.Like a statutory presumption or one

established by regulation, the validity, perhaps in a varying degree, depends upon the rationality of what is proved and what is inferred. ' 17 The
NLRB's solicitation/distribution presumptions basically consist of four
factors: work time, nonwork time, work areas, and nonwork areas. A rule
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)(§ 7 of the NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
13. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
14. 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 12 L.R.R.M. 183 (1943).
15. Id. at 843-44, 12 L.R.R.M. at 183.
16. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). In this case, the employer was a large military aircraft manufacturer whose rule prohibited all soliciting in its factory or offices. Republic argued that because its rule was applied indiscriminately to all solicitation it did not violate the NLRA.
The Court held that the rule violated the NLRA by prohibiting union solicitation on the
employer's premises on employees' nonwork time, regardless of the indiscriminate application. Id. at 805.
17. Id. at 804-05.
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prohibiting solicitation during an employee's nonworking time is presumed invalid, even if limited to working areas. If the rule is applied to
working time, it is presumed valid. A rule prohibiting distribution of
union literature during nonworking time in nonwork areas is presumed
invalid. If the rule is applied to work areas, it is presumed valid, even if it
covers both working and nonworking time. Distinguishing work time
from nonwork time is easy; it is the determination of what is a work area
and what is a nonwork area that usually presents problems. Thus, absent
special circumstances, an employer's restrictions on employee solicitation
during nonworking time, and on distribution during nonworking time in
nonworking areas, violate section 8(a)(1).
Hospitals were recognized as having "special circumstances," specifically the need to maintain "the tranquil atmosphere essential to the Hospital's primary function of providing quality patient care,"1 to justify additional restrictions on union solicitation and distribution. In fact,
governmental hospitals were exempted from coverage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act 1 and private, nonprofit hospitals were exempted under the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.2
However, low wages and poor working conditions in the health care industry resulted in low employee morale and high employment turnover."'
It was determined by Congress that "the extension of organizational and
collective-bargaining rights would ameliorate these conditions and elevate
the standard of patient care. ' 2 2 Congress felt coverage under the NLRA
would eliminate the need for recognition strikes and picketing which had
resulted under the exemption,22 since organizational and recognition disputes could be resolved by the Act's provisions." The 1974 amendments
were thus passed to extend coverage of the Taft-Hartley Act to private,
nonprofit hospitals. In so doing, Congress emphasized that self-organization activities should not be allowed to disrupt "the continuity of patient
care." '2' Thus, the NLRB's task, set forth as the objective of the 1974
amendments, was to strike a balance between the conflicting interests of
employees, patients, and employers. Employees have the right to participate in the determination of their wages, hours, and working conditions
18. St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir.
1977).
19. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
20. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
21. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 12936-38 (1974)(remarks of Sen. Cranston).
22. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 498 (1978), citing 120 CONG. REc. 16899900 (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
23. S.Rep. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprintedin [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3946, 3948.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 6-7, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3951.
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as do other workers covered by the NLRA. But patients must have continuous, quality health care, which only health care facility employers can
maintain.26
Because the NLRB's presumptions combine work and nonwork time
with work and nonwork areas, it is easiest to analyze the application of
these presumptions in terms of areas of the health care facility to which a
particular no solitication-no distribution rule is directed. Prior to 1974,
hospitals' restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution were generally upheld.' 7 However, after the 1974 amendments were passed, the
NLRB and the courts were faced with establishing the permissible reach
of employer restrictions on solicitation and distribution in private, nonprofit health care institutions.
II.

IMMEDIATE PATIENT CARE AREAS

In St. John's Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc.," the NLRB concluded that the special characteristics of hospitals justified a rule different from that which was usually applied to other employers. The NLRB
modified its presumptions for hospitals with respect to immediate patient
care areas. The hospital's rule in St. John's allowed employee solicitation
and distribution of union literature only in nonworking, employee-only
areas on nonworking time,"s and was thus presumptively invalid. 0 The
NLRB conceded, however, that the presumption was partially rebutted
by the unique situation in a hospital, where quality patient care can be
maintained only in a quiet, peaceful atmosphere.31 Thus, a hospital's no
solicitation-no distribution rule applied to strictly patient care areas such
as "patients' rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive
treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas""2 would be held valid by the
NLRB. However, the NLRB refused to modify its presumptions as ap26. Shepard, supra note 1, at 9.
27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Summit Nursing Convalescent Home, 472 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir.
1973)(court of appeals upheld a no solicitation-no distribution rule applied to all patient

and public access areas of the Home); Guyan Valley Hosp., Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 107, 81
L.R.R.M. 1023 (1972)(NLRB upheld a rule restricting solicitations in all working areas).
28. 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 91 L.R.P.M. 1333 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The NLRB stated: "We recognize that the primary function of a hospital is patient
care and that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying out of that function. In
order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may be justified in imposing somewhat more
stringent prohibitions on solicitation than are generally permitted." Id. at 1150, 91 L.R.R.M.
at 1334.
32. Id. at 1150, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1334.
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plied to "patient access areas such as cafeterias, lounges, and the like." 8
Thus, the NLRB decided the hospital's rule was overly-broad, in spite of
the availability of the employee-only areas for union activity.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in St. John's Hospitaland
School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB,'" denied full enforcement of the
NLRB's order limiting no solicitation rules to those covering only patient
care areas. The court found that the NLRB's balancing test between the
interests of patients well enough to visit areas such as the cafeteria,
lounges, and the like and those of employees seeking to discuss or solicit
union support did not give appropriate weight to Congress' expressed
concern for the continuous care of patients in the hospital."5 Since the
NLRB conceded that the hospital's primary function of providing quality
patient care was disrupted by union activity in "strictly patient care areas," 6 the court found the NLRB's conclusion that union solicitation
would disrupt care in some patient access areas but not in others unreasonable.3 7 The court of appeals also broadened the scope of immediate
patient care areas to include halls, stairways, elevators, and waiting rooms
accessible to patients."
Two major issues were raised in the St. John's decision which were
answered by the court of appeals but nevertheless remain controversial
today. The first was whether there were other areas available in the hospital for solicitation and dissemination of union information. As noted
above, the NLRB found that the availability of other means of access to
employees for union activity was not sufficient to justify the hospital's
restrictions in patient access areas (such as cafeterias and gift shops). The
court of appeals, however, considered the stipulated facts that the employee-only lunchroom was frequented by eighty percent or more of the
employees daily and that there were a number of other employee-only
areas, including lounges, locker rooms, restrooms, and parking areas to be
significant factors in reviewing the balance struck by the NLRB.8 9
The court's consideration of the stipulated facts raises the second major issue-the question of the amount and sufficiency of the evidence
presented in the record. Although not discussed at length in the decision,
the hospital had the burden of rebutting the NLRB's presumptions of
invalidity. The court of appeals found that the NLRB's distinction be33. Id. at 1151, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1334.
34. 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 1374.
36. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1334.
37. 557 F.2d at 1374.
38. Id. at 1375. These additional areas, however, remain in dispute. See text accompanying note 46, infra.
39. Id.
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tween strictly patient care areas and other patient access areas was unsupported in the record. 40 It noted that no evidence was presented to the
administrative law judge relating to the "relative abilities of confined visi-vis ambulatory patients to withstand the admittedly 'unsettling' effects

of union solicitation or the medical and administrative reasons for deciding whether to confine a patient to his or her room."' 1 Without supporting evidence, the NLRB's conclusion that ambulatory patients visiting
the cafeteria or gift shop would not be disturbed by union activity was

unreasonable. The court found that the NLRB had relied, not on record
evidence, but on its own perceptions of what constituted quality patient

care ina modern hospital. The court considered the NLRB to be delving
in evaluating
beyond its area of expertise in labor/management relations
42

patients' mental, physical, and emotional concerns.

Thus, the NLRB's presumptions as applied to immediate patient care
areas were modified by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in St. John's
to allow prohibitions of solicitation and distribution in these limited ar-

eas. This modification has been followed by later court and NLRB decisions. 48 The NLRB's definition of "immediate patient care areas" has not
been broadened beyond patients' rooms and operating and treatment
rooms, as the Tenth Circuit attempted to do in St. John's. Rather, the
exact scope of permissible restrictions on solicitation by hospital employers in other areas has remained in dispute. In fact, two circuit courts,
shortly after the decision in St. John's, specifically declined to follow the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning with respect to areas beyond those of immediate patient care." The issues raised by the court of appeals in St. John's

40. Id. at 1372.
41. Id. at 1373.
42. Id.
43. See St. Joseph Hosp., 228 N.L.R.B. 158, 94 L.R.R.M. 1413 (1977); Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344, 92 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied
in part, 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978), afl'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 442
U.S. 773 (1979); Beth Israel Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1193, 92 L.R.R.M. 1078 (1976), enforced,
554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), afl'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Lutheran Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 176,
92 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 564 F.2d 208
(7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 903 (1978); Baylor Univ. Medical Center,
225 N.L.R.B. 771, 92 L.R.R.M. 1640 (1976), enforcement granted in part and denied in
part, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978).
44. In Lutheran Hosp., Inc., v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit enforced the NLRB's order that a no solicitation-no distribution
rule which prohibits all solicitation and distribution in all areas to which patients and visitors have access, other than immediate patient care areas, is unlawful. In NLRB v. Beth
Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), afl'd, 437 U.S. 483 (1978), the First Circuit enforced the NLRB's order enjoining the hospital from prohibiting solicitation and distribution in the hospital's cafeteria and coffee shop, to which both employees and the public had
access.
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are by no means settled and have been raised by later court decisions as
the NLRB and the courts have attempted to define the limits for permissible restrictions of union activity in areas other than strictly patient care
areas of hospitals.
III.
A.

PATIENT

AccEss AREAS

Cafeterias and Coffee Shops

The Supreme Court, for the first time since the 1974 amendments, had
an opportunity to establish definite guidelines regarding union solicitation and distribution in a health care institution in Beth Israel Hospital
v. NLRB.'" The Court failed to do so. However, the Supreme Court did
affirm the validity of the NLRB's presumptions with respect to a hospital's no solicitation-no distribution rule applied to the hospital cafeteria
and coffee shop. At issue in Beth Israel was the hospital's no solicitationno distribution rule which prohibited union activity except in certain employee locker rooms and adjacent restrooms. Specifically, the rule's application to the hospital's cafeteria and coffee shop was being challenged.
Because Beth Israel's rule banned union activities in nonwork areas during nonwork time, the NLRB had ordered the hospital to cease and desist
from enforcing the rule. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced the NLRB's order because the hospital had failed "to show that
special circumstances justified its curtailment of protected activities in
these two places."' 6
The Supreme Court, in affirming the court of appeals' decision, approved of the NLRB's balancing test, which weighed the "conflicting legitimate interests"' 7 of hospital employers, employees, and patients. In so
doing, the Court rejected Beth Israel's argument that the NLRB's decision conflicted with the congressional policy set forth in the 1974 amendments. The Court noted that there was nothing in the legislative history
of the 1974 amendments to suggest that solicitation in the hospital setting was to be entirely prohibited or that it was to be limited to the extent the NLRB had required when the 1974 amendments were passed."8
The Court inferred from congressional silence on the issue of solicitation
and distribution that Congress intended to rely on the NLRB to determine the validity of rules restricting self-organizational activity.
The issues raised but not necessarily resolved in the St. John's decision
were also addressed by the Supreme Court in Beth Israel. The issue of
45.

437 U.S. 483 (1978).

46. 554 F.2d at 480.
47. 437 U.S. at 501.
48. Id. at 496.
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the availability of other areas for union activity was discussed by the
Court and was resolved by the evidence in the record. The Court noted
that solicitation and distribution were not permitted in all locker areas,
that only a small percentage of the 2,200 regular hospital employees had
access to those areas where solicitation was permitted, and that the hospital itself did not disseminate messages to its employees in the locker
rooms.'9 The cafeteria, however, was frequented by a large percentage of
the employees (employees made up seventy-seven percent of the cafeteria's patrons in a three-day survey) and was a "common gathering room
for employees."5 0 The Court found that the NLRB had properly taken
the evidence into account in its decision forbidding the hospital from
prohibiting union activity in the cafeteria, noting that the cafeteria was
an area "in which the risk of harm to patients is relatively low as compared to potential alternative locations within the facility." 51
The sufficiency of the evidence was relevant to a second issue as
well-whether the record supported the NLRB's conclusion that union
activity was unlikely to be disruptive when conducted in areas other than
immediate health care areas. The Supreme Court found that the NLRB's
conclusion was "fully supported."" The Court noted that the evidence
showed that patients received meals in their rooms and visited the cafeteria only with a doctor's permission. Moreover, Only 1.56% (again, from a
three-day survey) of the cafeteria's patrons were patients. Also significant
was the fact that the hospital had previously allowed some union solicitation in the cafeteria (under orders from the Massachusetts Labor Commission) and that the hospital failed to introduce "any evidence to show
that solicitation or distribution was or would be harmful."" The Court
concluded that the hospital's rule was more restrictive than necessary and
that less restrictive means of regulating employees' organizational activity
existed which would still protect patient care and not violate the NLRA."
The Court did not discuss burdens, but it is assumed that the hospital
bore the burden of rebutting the NLRB's presumptions. A third argument raised by Beth Israel was that it was irrational for the NLRB to
distinguish between the dining area in a public restaurant and the hospital's cafeteria." The Court disposed of this argument based on the pri49. Id. at 489-90.

50. Id. at 490.
51. Id. at 505.
52. Id. at 502.
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 503. The Court made two suggestions: the hospital could enforce a rule prohibiting distribution to or solicitation of nonemployees or the hospital could require face-toface distribution of literature as opposed to allowing employees to leave literature lying on

tables accessible to anyone. 437 U.S. at 503 n.23.
55. The retail store exception, as developed in May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 15
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mary purpose test suggested but not followed by the court of appeals in
St. John's." The public restaurant exemption was granted because the
primary purpose of the restaurant's operation is to serve customers in its
dining area, and this purpose would be substantially disrupted by employee organizational activity. A hospital's primary purpose, on the other
hand, is to provide quality patient care, which is delivered primarily in
operating rooms, patients' rooms, and patients' lounges. The cafeteria,
with seventy-seven percent of its patrons being employees of the hospital,
functioned "more as an employee-service area than a patient-care area,"
and was thus distinguishable from the public restaurant.
A final issue raised in Beth Israel was whether the presumptions derived from the industrial setting of Republic Aviation were appropriate
for the health care setting. Beth Israel Hospital argued that the NLRB
lacked the medical expertise to make a judgment concerning the likelihood of disruption to patient care by union solicitation and distribution.
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, noting that Congress had
delegated to the NLRB "the authority to develop and apply fundamental
national labor policy."'" The Court stated that the NLRB is not an "expert" in a number of areas besides the health care industry, but it is still
vested with the responsibility of developing and administering federal national labor relations policy to all of the areas over which it has jurisdiction.5 9 The court's role of review is narrowly confined to approving the
NLRB's rules and enforcing its application of those rules unless the rules
are inconsistent with the NLRA or the application is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.60
Thus, the Supreme Court in Beth Israel affirmed the NLRB's presumptions with respect to a hospital's no solicitation-no distribution rule

L.R.R.M. 173 (1944), modified and enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 725 (1946), allowed a retail employer to ban solicitation during nonwork time in a work
area because of the disruption on the selling floor and the irritation to customers. The employer's commercial interests were recognized as outweighing the employees' interests in
union activity in the retail setting. That reasoning was extended to public restaurants as
well. Marriott Corp., (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978, 92 L.R.R.M. 1028 (1976); McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404, 84 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1973). The issue of whether a hospital
cafeteria or gift shop should be granted the same exemption as retail establishments and
public restaurants was first raised in St. John's. The court of appeals held that the hospital
had the same legitimate interests in its cafeteria and gift shop as do retail stores and restaurants, and therefore had the right to prohibit union activity in these areas, even though the
areas are not directly related to the hospital's primary function of providing patient care.
557 F.2d at 1375.
56. See 557 F.2d at 1375.
57. 437 U.S. at 506.

58. Id. at 500.
59.

Id. at 501.

60. Id.
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when applied to its cafeteria and coffee shop. In so doing, the Supreme
Court effectively excluded cafeterias and coffee shops (and presumably
other similar eating places) from its definition of immediate patient care
areas. However, the decision turned on the evidence presented, and no
definite standards were established to decide future cases. The Court left
unanswered several important questions. First, what is the difference, if
any, between "immediate patient care areas" and "patient access areas"?
Second, assuming, as the NLRB and the Supreme Court did, that the
burden is on the hospital to prove that a particular area falls in either of
these categories, what evidence will be required to carry that burden?
Third, what is the determinative factor in establishing the validity of a no
solicitation-no distribution rule: remoteness of disruption to patients,
availability of access to other areas in which union activities will be permitted, or the primary function of a particular area? Fourth, if there is no
determinative factor, how will each be weighed? Last, are the presumptions established by the NLRB in approaching a no solicitation-no distribution rule valid when applied to the health care industry, and if so, how
are these presumptions to be overcome in this setting?
These unanswered questions are reflective of the uncertainty in this
area of labor law. So also are the lengthy opinions of Justices Blackmun
and Powell, who wrote separate concurrences in the judgment in Beth
Israel. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined each of these
opinions. Justice Blackmun expressed the fear that
this unusual case will be deemed to be an example for all hospital eatingfacility cases, and that the Board and the courts now will go further
down the open-solicitation road than they would have done, had a more
usual hospital case been the one first to come here. Hospitals, after all,
are not factories or mines or assembly plants. They are hospitals, where
human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are
under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day's activity, and where the patient and
that family-irrespective of whether that patient and that family are labor or management oriented-need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and
helpful atmosphere, rather than one remindful of the tensions of the
marketplace in addition to the tensions of the sick bed. 6'
Justice Blackmun eloquently emphasized the uniqueness of the health
care setting and the need for careful deliberation of labor relations activity in this area.
Justice Powell argued at length that the presumptions established in
the Republic Aviation line of cases are inappropriately applied to the
health care setting. Powell concurred because in his opinion the weight of
61.

Id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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evidence in this case supported the NLRB's decision. He expressed concern, however, in applying presumptions arising from industrial and manufacturing settings to the health care setting, where employees and public
commingle. 62 Powell urged that the presence of the public as well as patients made the hospital setting more like that of the public restaurant or
the retail establishment. The lack of a profit motive in the hospital's case
did not diminish the hospital's concern for its patients and visitors. Thus,
Justice Powell's concurrence raised two of the important issues: the appropriateness of applying the NLRB's presumptions to the health care
industry and the similarity of hospital eating facilities with restaurants
and retail stores.
The Supreme Court, in its per curiam decision in NLRB v. Baylor University Medical Center," considered the validity of the hospital's no solicitation rule as applied to corridors and the cafeteria. The NLRB had
held that the rule as applied was overly-broad and violated section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
refused to enforce the NLRB's order. The court found no supporting evidence for the NLRB's position that the corridors did not warrant the
same protection granted other immediate patient care areas. The court of
appeals chose to ignore the NLRB's distinction between hospital cafeterias and public restaurants or retail stores established in earlier decisions,
and thus, in effect, granted an exemption to the hospital's cafeteria."
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Beth Israel on the issue of the cafeteria. The
answer to the question of whether a hospital's cafeteria should be treated,
for presumption purposes, like public restaurants and retail establishments is clearly no. In a later Supreme Court case, the issue was not even
discussed by the majority.65
The Court refused to review the corridor issue.6" This refusal sparked a
partial dissent from Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, revealing the continuing lack of unanimity of the Court on these
issues. Brennan urged that the NLRB's "general principle of requiring
hospitals to justify their prohibitions of solicitation 6 7 should apply beyond a cafeteria's four walls in order "to insure that the proper legal stan-

62. Id. at 511 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 439 U.S. 9 (1978).
64. Id. at 10.
65. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979). However, Justice Blackmun's concurrence reiterated the importance of the proof presented: "What may be true of one hospital's gift shop and cafeteria may not be true of another's." Id. at 791 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring).
66.
67.

439 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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dard is applied to the facts. '"" Justice Brennan's call for a proper legal
standard would indeed seem crucial in light of the confusion in this area.
B. Other Patient Access Areas
NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc." is the Supreme Court's most recent
attempt to deal with the no solicitation-no distribution rule in the health
care setting. As in Beth Israel, the Court was far from unanimous in its
holdings. Justice Powell wrote for the majority, while concurrences were
written by Justice Blackmun, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Brennan,
with whom Justices White and Marshall joined. Baptist Hospital's no solicitation rule was applied to "any area of the Hospital which is accessible
to or utilized by the public,"7 including the lobbies, gift shop, cafeteria,
and entrances on the first floor of the hospital and the corridors, sitting
rooms, and public restrooms on the other floors. In areas not accessible to
patients, employees were allowed to solicit in work areas on nonwork time
and to distribute materials in nonwork areas on nonwork time." The
NLRB had held that the hospital's rule was invalid and ordered the hospital to cease and desist its restraint of solicitation "in any area. . . other
than immediate patient care areas."'" The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the order because it found the hospital had presented sufficient
evidence that the solicitation would produce significant disruption of patient care.78
The Supreme Court's decision, which affirmed in part and vacated and
remanded in part, turned specifically on the evidence in the record. The
Court was persuaded to allow the hospital's no solicitation rule to stand
with respect to the corridors and sitting rooms on patients' floors because
of the sheer weight of evidence put on by the hospital in the form of
testimony by two physicians and one hospital administrator. With respect
to the cafeteria, gift shop, and lobbies on the first floor, the Court was not
persuaded that the hospital had sufficiently proved that disruption of patient care or disturbance of patients would result by allowing union solicitation. This decision is significant because it indicates that the Court will
continue to make its decisions on a case-by-case determination rather
than with definite rules. Also, the Baptist decision gives a more definitive
scope to the areas in which a hospital may restrict union activity. In
reaching its decision, the Court discussed the issues raised in earlier
68. Id.
69.
70.
71.
tients
72.
73.

442 U.S. 773 (1979).
Id. at 776 n.2.
The parties agreed that the hospital's rule as applied to areas not accessible to paand the public was valid.
Baptist Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344, 346, 92 L.R.R.M. 1057, (1976).
576 F.2d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1978).
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cases.
The availability of other areas of the hospital for union activity was
noted by the Court as an element supporting its decision to uphold the
hospital's ban on union activity in the corridors and sitting rooms on patients' floors. The hospital offered uncontradicted evidence that solicitation was allowed on nonwork time in other areas of the hospital, including
the nurses' stations, utility rooms, employee lounges, and maintenance
and laundry buildings. This evidence, while not sufficient to justify the
ban on solicitation in the cafeteria, gift shop, and first floor areas, did
strengthen the validity of the ban with respect to the other areas of the
hospital.
The hospital's evidence resolved a second issue as well, that of whether
the NLRB was supported in its finding that the hospital had not
presented sufficient special circumstances to justify its ban. The Supreme
Court found that the NLRB's decision was supported with respect to
some areas, but lacked support "for its sweeping protection of solicitation
in all but 'immediate patient-care areas.' ",74 The hospital's evidence included the testimony of its Vice President for Personnel Services who testified that the hospital's rule was based on its experience of prior disruption to patients by union organizational activity. The two physicians'
testimony consisted of similar concern for patients' well-being and recovery.7 6 The hospital provided evidence that patients, often in critical condition, were moved through corridors and sitting rooms adjoining or accessible to patients' rooms. It was shown that the sitting rooms were used
by patients and their family and friends, as well as by doctors for conferences with these people. The Court found no reason to doubt that union
activity could disturb patients in these areas.7 6
With respect to the cafeteria, gift shop, and first floor lobbies, the
Court found that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the NLRB's
finding that the well-being and recovery of patients did not require the
hospital's rule against solicitation in these areas.7 7 No convincing evidence was presented by the hospital concerning how many patients frequented the cafeteria and gift shop and first floor lobbies. The Court
noted that patients above the first floor rarely left their rooms. Moreover,
the testimony of both the Vice President and one of the physicians indicated that at least some kinds of solicitation in public areas such as the
cafeteria could be permitted without significantly harming patients or patient care.76 Thus, the Court found that the NLRB's presumption had not
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

442 U.S. at 782.
Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 786.
Id.
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been rebutted by the hospital's evidence with respect to the cafeteria, gift
shop, and first floor lobbies.
It is significant to note that, with respect to this second issue concerning the sufficiency of evidence, the Court interpreted the NLRB's presumption as placing "on the hospital the burden of proving, with respect
to areas to which it applies, that union solicitation may adversely affect
patients."'" In a footnote, the Court emphasized that the NLRB's presumption could be overcome with proof that the union solicitation "is
likely either to disrupt patient care or disturb patients."6 0 The Court,
thus, answered one of Beth Israel's unanswered questions: the burden of
proof must be carried by the hospital seeking to justify its no solicitation
rule, and may be met by evidence of significant disturbance to patients or
patient care. The Court's statements also reveal a heightened sensitivity
to the uniqueness of the health care institution. Not only may patients be
affected directly by union solicitation carried on in their presence, but
they may also be affected indirectly by solicitation which hinders those
employees who must care for the patients.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence re-emphasized the warning given the
NLRB in Beth Israel and repeated by the majority here as well:
[T]he Board [bears] a heavy continuing responsibility to review its policies concerning organizational activities in various parts of hospitals.
Hospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness and importance. They give rise to unique considerations that do not apply in
the industrial settings with which the Board is more familiar. The Board
should stand ready to revise its rulings if future experience demonstrates
that the well-being of patients is in fact jeopardized. 81
Blackmun's expressed concern over the NLRB's possible need for revision
reflects a hesitancy by the Court to lay down strict rules in resolving the
conflicting interests in these hospital cases.
A final issue raised in Beth Israel and discussed by the Supreme Court
in Baptist is whether the presumptions applied by the NLRB to hospitals' no solicitation-no distribution rules are even valid in the hospital
setting. The Supreme Court refused to approve the court of appeals'
holding that the NLRB's presumption that solicitation outside of immediate patient care areas does not disrupt patient care or disturb patients
79. Id. at 781.
80. Id. at 781 n.11 (emphasis in original). The Court further stated:
The distinction is an important one. Solicitation may disrupt patient care if it
interferes with the health-care activities of doctors, nurses, and staff, even though
not conducted in the presence of patients. And solicitation that does not impede
the efforts of those charged with the responsibility of caring for patients nonetheless may disturb patients exposed to it.
81. Id. at 790, quoting 437 U.S. at 508.
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was irrational.The court of appeals concluded that the NLRB should be
required to carry the burden of proof that union activity in any given
patient access area would not interfere with patient care. While the Supreme Court could not agree that the presumption was totally irrational
and thus shifted the burden of proof to the NLRB, the Court did express
doubt on the presumption's validity as applied in the health care field.6 '
The Court even went so far as to suggest what, in the future, the NLRB
should consider when applying its presumption:
[A] modern hospital houses a complex array of facilities and techniques
for patient care and therapy that defy simply classification. Patients not
undergoing treatment at the moment are cared for in a variety of settings-recovery rooms, intensive-care units, patients' rooms, wards, sitting rooms, and even in the corridors, where patients often are encouraged to walk, or to visit with their families. In different hospitals, the
use and physical layout of such a variety of areas may require varying
resolutions of questions about the validity of bans on union solicitation.
In addition, outpatient clinics such as the Hospital's emergency room
and "shortstay" unit.., may raise special considerations because of the
nature of the services rendered to patients there.
Some corridors in some hospitals, as well as elevators and stairways,
may be used neither for treatment nor for care, but may be of great importance in the movement of patients (and emergency equipment)
through the hospital.... Still another group of areas, including cafeterias and gift shops, also may present difficult problems regarding the validity of no-solicitation rules ...
In discharging its responsibility for administration of the Act, the
Board must frame its rules and administer them with careful attention to
the wide variety of activities within the modern hospital.,
The Court's lengthy suggestion is an important one, for it seeks to shape
and refine the scope of the Board's investigation, and to give further direction to the hospital seeking to justify its ban on solicitation by laying
out some of the important areas the Board might consider.
The Baptist decision does not go farther than this suggestion by the
Court. The hospital was found to have marshalled sufficient evidence to
rebut the NLRB's presumptions with respect to corridors and sitting
rooms on patients' floors, and thus the Court declined to "decide the rationality of this portion of the Board's presumption, or undertake the
task of framing the limits of an appropriate presumption regarding the
permissibility of union solicitation in a modern hospital. '' " The limits of
an appropriate presumption are exactly what are needed by the NLRB
82. Id. at 788-89.
83. Id. at 789 n.16.
84. Id.
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and by hospital employers and employees in order to clarify the confusion
surrounding permissible union activity restrictions.
What is revealed by these hospital cases, however, is that the evidence
presented in the record will probably be the determinative factor. The
Supreme Court seems unwilling to modify the NLRB's presumptions regarding no solicitation-no distribution rules in the hospital setting any
more than as applied to "immediate patient care areas." The Court is
willing, however, to uphold a hospital's ban on union activity if that hospital can offer enough evidence of the activity's harmful effects on patients and patient care. Exactly how much evidence is required has not
been established, but Baptist presents a good guide. It is clear also that
the hospital will bear the risk of non-persuasion. The NLRB and the
Court will approach a particular hospital's restrictions in terms of the areas in the hospital to which the restrictions are applied. From the cases,
it seems reasonable to conclude that a hospital's cafeteria and gift shops
are areas in which a ban will probably not be allowed, although, again,
the statistical evidence of who visits these areas and how frequently will
be crucial. Baylor and Baptist suggest that corridors and various rooms
adjoining immediate patient care areas are areas in which a ban may be
upheld if sufficient evidence is presented. Union activity may be allowed
in other areas of the hospital, depending on the particular facts of the
case, including whether the hospital provides sufficient areas other than
those in question in which employees may exercise their organizational

rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION -

THE PRINCIPLE

OF AcCOMODATION

Self-organizational rights of employees must be protected by the
NLRB in myriad factual situations, the hospital setting being only one of
these situations. The NLRB's presumptions regarding no solicitation-no
distribution rules have been described as applying "the principle of accomodation."" "Accomodation between [employee-organization rights
and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction
of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."" The Court in
Baptist cast doubt on the continuing validity of the NLRB's presumptions as applied to the hospital setting and charged the NLRB to "stand
ready" to modify or change its approach to cases in which the care of
patients "is in fact jeopardized. 6 8 7 As the NLRB and the courts struggle
to accomodate the conflicting interests of hospital employers, employees,
and patients, the labor law practitioner in the health care industry should
85.
86.
87.

437 U.S. at 492.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
442 U.S. at 790.
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be aware of the lack of definite standards by which to adjudge the validity of a no solicitation rule and of the importance of evidence of harm by
union activity in this regard. This area of law is by no means settled; in
fact, the no solicitation-no distribution rule is a controversial issue in
many other areas of labor law as well." Labor law practitioners in the
health care field should also "stand ready" to revise their approach to
problems presented them which involve the no solicitation-no distribution rule as the courts continue to struggle for viable standards to apply.
SUSAN P. MCWELLIAMS

88. In one recent decision, Dallas Ass'n of Community Organizations for Reform Now v.
Dallas County Hosp. Dist., 478 F. Supp. 1250 (N.D. Tex. 1979), a district court held that a
hospital is not a public forum for first amendment purposes. The court upheld defendant
hospital's no solicitation rule, stating that because the rule was applied nondiscriminately, it
did not violate any first amendment rights of plaintiffs, an organization seeking to distribute
leaflets criticizing the quality of health care conditions in the hospital. In another recent
decision, Times Publishing Co., v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1979), the "primary purpose test" used in Beth Israel was applied in the retail setting to determine that a newspaper publisher's operations in its lobby, although essential to the publisher's primary purpose, were not sufficiently similar to those of a retail establishment's selling floor or a
restaurant's serving area and thus, the publisher's no solicitation rule as applied to the
lobby during employees' nonworking hours was invalid.

